dwelt on class divisions to explain partisan choices (Dietz, 1985) , including discussion of how the growth of the informal sector weakened the partisan manifestation of the class cleavage (Cameron, 1994; Roberts, 1996) . Yet the salience of ethnic divisions for party competition remains unexplored. This is not entirely surprising given the widespread consensus on the absence of indigenous politics in contemporary Peru (Yashar, 1998) .
While the indigenous politics literature emphasizes the cultural and organizational components of indigenous cleavages (Van Cott, 2005; Rice and Van Cott, 2006 ; on the three components of cleavages, see Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 213-20) , we argue that the sociological component is the most important to explain the emergence of indigenous political representation, not just in Peru, but for cases like Bolivia and Ecuador as well. Previous research has argued that the incorporation of indigenous issues in Bolivia and Ecuador was achieved because indigenous voters in these countries are culturally distinct from the rest of the population and indigenous movements have launched indigenous political parties (Van Cott, 2005) . While some literature assumes that indigenous Peruvians are not culturally distinct and do not have organizations to mobilize people for indigenous causes, other literature has shown these assertions to be false (see, for instance, García and Lucero, 2004) . Indigenous cultural and organizational manifestations of the indigenous cleavage have long been present in Latin America. Only recently have indigenous ethnic identities emerged as political identities. This is because two presidential campaigns-those of Alejandro Toledo (2001) and Ollanta Humala (2006)-have realized the electoral potential of indigenous voters; recognizing this, both made numerous overt attempts to court indigenous voters. Arguments in the broader ethnic politics literature related to material grievances, the institutional setting, and the size of ethnic groups are unable to explain why indigenous issues were not represented prior to Toledo.
We utilize public opinion data from the World Values Survey across three separate presidential elections (1995, 2001, and 2006) to test whether the sociological element of an ethnic cleavage-party preferences-has emerged in Peru as a political division. The results show that indigenous identities have become politically salient, and that Toledo's campaign successfully cultivated a significant electoral base among indigenous voters. This political division remains in 2006 with indigenous support going largely to the parties associated with Humala. These results confirm the increasing salience of indigenous identities that has been documented previously in other Latin American countries (Madrid, 2005a (Madrid, , 2005b (Madrid, , 2008 , but not in Peru.
The Peruvian Case
During the 1980s, following the country's return to civilian rule, Peruvian party politics appeared relatively stable: four major parties-the center-right Popular Action party (AP), the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party (APRA), the leftist United Left (IU) and the conservative Popular Christian Party (PPC)-accounted for the bulk of the popular vote (Dietz and Myers, 2007: 69; Levitsky, 1999) . These parties -possessed national structures, discernable programs or ideologies, and identifiable social bases‖ (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003: 6) . These established parties, however, fell into crisis as a consequence of the economic collapse of the 1980s and heightened levels of political violence. The growth of the informal economy, which represented more than 50 percent of the economically active population by 1990, further weakened class-based organizations and eliminated partisan identities (Cameron, 1994) .
The economic collapse and deteriorating social conditions of the 1980s led to the implosion of the party system. In the 1995 presidential election, which resulted in Fujimori's second consecutive presidential term, the major political parties of the 1980s (AP, APRA, PPC and IU) collectively accounted for only 10 percent of the popular vote (Dietz and Myers, 2007: 69 According to García (2005: 55) , the Paniagua government, while short, was a -crucial turning point in Peruvian indigenous politics.‖ Two important developments are worth noting.
The first one was the creation of the National Truth Commission to investigate the human rights abuses that took place during the country's insurgency war. The Commission's work helped to bring to light the plight of indigenous people through hundreds of televised testimonies. Conflict with the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) left a death toll of more than 69,000 people among civilians, armed forces and insurgent militants; about two-thirds of the people who were killed or disappeared spoke Quechua, one of the country's most widely spoken indigenous languages party label Perú Posible. Toledo frequently used indigenous symbols and discussed issues of concern to indigenous voters during his presidential campaign. In 2000, for instance, he led a major protest in opposition to Fujimori's third presidential term, calling it -la marcha de los cuatro suyos‖ (the march of the four suyos, or the march of the four corners of the Incan empire).
During a widely-publicized campaign stop, Toledo's wife-Eliane Karp, who speaks fluent Quechua-invoked Incan deities known as apus on behalf of her husband, and suggested that Toledo represented the reincarnation of the Inca Pachacuti. President Toledo subsequently inaugurated his term in a ceremony at the ruins of Machu Picchu, and there signed the Declaration of Machu Picchu in support of indigenous rights. Toledo often used the term -cholo‖-which is often used to describe dark-skinned individuals, including those of indigenous decent, and still regarded as an insult by most Peruvians (García, 2005: 28) -to draw attention to his Andean origins. Despite Toledo's campaign rhetoric, his government failed to address the plight of indigenous groups, particularly regarding environmental damage to indigenous habitat (Greene, 2006) and the dislocations that resulted from the concessions given to mining and logging companies. Fujimori's economic liberalization program had made mining investment a very attractive industry: mining claims by extractive companies skyrocketed from 4 million to 25 million hectares during the early 1990s (García, 2005: 58) , and eleven of the world's top twenty mining corporations now have operations in Peru (Bury, 2002: 6) . Because mining is concentrated in the highlands where many indigenous Peruvians reside, this industry has had considerable impact on the rural population, where poverty is endemic (Loker, 1999; Korzeniewicz, 2000; López and della Maggiora, 2000) . Due to the negative environmental effects associated with mining, transnational mining companies operating in Peru's highlands have repeatedly come under siege by rural, national, and transnational protesters, constituting the most common type of social conflict in Peru today (Arce, 2008: 52-55) . García (2005: 28) (Forero, 2006 
The Politicization of Indigenous Identities
Much work in comparative politics has examined issues of ethnicity and party politics.
Regarding the conditions under which indigenous identities (and ethnicity more generally) become politicized, some contend that ethnic conflicts-and the emergence of ethnic identities and the parties that represent them-are rooted in material grievances (see, for instance, Chua, 2003 ; for a comprehensive review, see Horowitz, 1985: 105-135) . A long line of research suggests that permissive electoral systems (as well as other institutions) allow ethnic parties to emerge (see, for instance, Horowitz, 1985; Van Cott, 2003; Rice and Van Cott, 2006) , while others stress that the size of the ethnic group matters as well (Posner, 2004; Madrid, 2005b) .
However, defining what constitutes an ethnic party is fraught with problems (Chandra, forthcoming) . Additionally, by focusing solely on the emergence of explicitly indigenous political parties, recent scholarship on the emergence of ethnic politics in Latin America may be ignoring significant indigenous political expressions among voters.
Contrary to previous literature, we argue that indigenous political identities have formed in Peru despite the absence of an explicitly -indigenous‖ party. We argue that it is more important to explain the emergence of indigenous political identities, whether represented by indigenous-based parties or as part of a multi-ethnic coalition. Although the examination of one country cannot resolve the major debates within this literature (including those not mentioned here), the case of Peru sheds some light onto these more prominent arguments. In particular, while some approaches to the study of ethnic politics are helpful in explaining the emergence of indigenous politics in Peru (grievance and ethnic group size explanations), and others are less helpful (institutional explanations), all are insufficient. While Peru has possessed many of the features highlighted by the literature as necessary for the emergence of ethnic political issues and parties for some time, the representation of indigenous issues by political parties constitutes a recent development. For this reason, we rely on arguments that stress the actions of political parties in creating and maintaining political identities among voters.
In terms of institutional explanations, the literature has focused on a few general themes.
One regards electoral volatility and party fragmentation, which are viewed by some as the first signs of the potential incorporation of indigenous groups into the party system (Madrid, 2005b; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007) . Other literature has argued that higher district magnitudes increase the likelihood of indigenous party success (Van Cott, 2003; Rice and Van Cott, 2006 ; see also Horowitz, 1985) . Finally, Van Cott (2003) has also argued that other institutional barriers-like difficulties in gaining ballot access and centralized governmenthamper indigenous representation.
The Peruvian case provides mixed support for these institutional arguments. For instance, recent developments in Peruvian party politics uphold arguments regarding electoral volatility and party fragmentation. As noted above, the Peruvian party system of the 1980s came unglued with Fujimori's rise to power. Since then, the party system has been characterized by high volatility and increased fragmentation as indigenous issues have been gradually incorporated into the political process (Dietz and Myers, 2007; Cameron, 2009; Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen, 2008) Explanations rooted in the sizes of ethnic groups and their material grievances appear somewhat more relevant to the Peruvian case. According to grievance-based accounts of ethnic identification, ethnic identities matter for party politics when such identities become socially and/or economically marginalized (Chua, 2003; Horowitz, 1985) . That indigenous Peruvians are economically marginalized-as predicted by grievance explanations-is supported by recent work demonstrating ties between indigenous identity and economic marginalization (Loker, 1999; Montoya, 1989; Crabtree, 2002; Korzeniewicz, 2000; López and della Maggiora, 2000 Regarding arguments related to the size of ethnic groups, some authors contend that only those ethnic groups that are sizable enough in number are represented by political parties (Posner, 2004; Madrid, 2005b often preferring the less marginalized "Mestizo" identity, which allows them to remove the stigmas attached to their culture and practices without abandoning these traditions (de la Cadena, 2000) . Indigenous identification has been hampered further by frequent rural migration that has dislocated people and disrupted cultural practices (Degregori, 1998) .
While there have always been indigenous Peruvians, they are just now beginning to identify as such, and as a result, the political parties are just now beginning to perceive indigenous voters as an electoral bloc that is sizable enough to be represented. Contrary to de la
Cadena (2000), García and Lucero (2004) contend that indigenous identity is not subsumed under Mestizo identity. They argue that -Indianness‖ has emerged recently in opposition to
Mestizo identity, being set in motion by a number of factors: indigenous Peruvians' disappointment with the policies of the Toledo government; conflicts between indigenous groups and the central government over the use of indigenous lands (see also Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen, 2008; Bebbington, 2007 Bebbington, , 2009 Aiello, 2009; Scurrah, 2008; De Echave, 2009; Wessendorf, 2008) ; financial, logistic, and moral support by the United Nations and several nongovernmental organizations promoting indigenous causes internationally (Greene, 2006) ; and political liberalization, with a livelier and freer press following the end of the Fujimori regime. Like other arguments associating the formation and maintenance of political identities to political actors (Schattschneider, 1960; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990) , the missing sociological aspect of the indigenous cleavage (political identities) in Peru has been created and activated by political parties in an effort to establish their electoral bases. This was first achieved by Toledo in 2001, who articulated issues and policies favorable to indigenous voters while making specific overtures and references to indigenous culture in order to capitalize on the political potential they offered. Humala continued this campaign strategy in 2006. Although subtle, these symbolic campaign messages provide important cues to voters about the issues candidates will represent (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Popkin, 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998) . The use of such symbolism is important to any candidate wishing to win over indigenous voters, particularly in low-information settings like Peru with its high party volatility. While indigenous issues were not the centerpieces of either candidate's campaign, the fact that both candidates expended considerable effort to attract indigenous voters by referencing indigenous symbols and promising to address indigenous voters' concerns demonstrates that indigenous issues have become important to party politics in Peru. This is a particularly noteworthy development in a Latin American country like Peru, where scholars have long noted that parties were unwilling to campaign along identity-based lines, and therefore cleavages of all sorts among voters were often weak (see, for instance, Dix, 1989) . 2006, respectively. Our dependent variable is a measure of respondents' first-party preferences, which allows us to measure individuals' likely vote choices. 5 We examine several of the major parties in each of the three time periods, plus those respondents indicating that they would not vote. 6 However, we focus primarily on the party of Alejandro Toledo (Perú instead of indigenous identity in order to show the differences between the two.
The effects of several other social identities are controlled. Three controls for class and status are included. The first is a measure of income, ranging from one (lowest) to 10 (highest income). Second, we control for union members who are coded as one, and zero otherwise.
Third, we include a measure of education, with those respondents attaining a university degree or higher coded as one, and zero otherwise. Controls for gender (females coded as one, males as zero), respondent age, and respondents' self-placements along a left-right ideology scale ranging from one (left) to 10 (right) are also included. To determine the robustness of these findings, we turn to the regression analyses. Furthermore, there is a significant gender gap in support for Humala: the probability of indigenous support among males is over 28 percent, and only about 19 percent among females.
Analysis
Despite this gender gap, support for Humala is higher among indigenous than non-indigenous respondents, both male and female.
Figure 1 about here
Turning now to whether the party support found in Figure 1 is rooted in leftist populism (as the comparative implications in Madrid [2005b] imply), the results in Figure 2 suggest that support for PNP/UPP reflects Humala's populist rhetoric. Poorer voters to the left of center (one standard deviation below both the means for income and left-right ideology) have predicted probabilities of PNP/UPP support that are much higher than wealthier, rightist voters (one standard deviation above both means). While these differences seem striking, looking at the confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities shows that the probabilities one standard deviation above and below the mean of income and left-right ideology are not significantly different from the probabilities when these variables are set at their means. 10 Additionally, the predicted probabilities for both females and males remain higher for indigenous than Mestizo voters. Taken together, these findings show an indigenous identity effect that is independent of class and ideology.
Figure 2 about here
The analysis now turns to differences between the two parties affiliated with Humala.
Because the PNP/UPP alliance occurred so late in the election campaign (see footnote 3), and because until then PNP was the party most affiliated with Humala's left-wing populist message, there should be sizable differences between support for PNP and UPP, particularly among indigenous voters. Figure 3 bears this point out: support for PNP is substantially higher than support for UPP. The predicted probabilities for UPP among male voters do not fall within the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the predicted probabilities of PNP support; the same result nearly obtains among female voters, too. Although Mestizo voters were significantly less likely to support PNP than indigenous voters, 11 the same pattern emerges.
Figure 3 about here
Viewing the findings presented above collectively, the fact that we find evidence of significant indigenous identity effects across two elections in which a different party catered to indigenous voters in each election suggests that indigenous political divisions may continue to remain a prominent feature in Peruvian politics. Consistent with the argument presented here regarding the formation of cleavages by political parties-and consistent with similar arguments made elsewhere (Schattschneider, 1960; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990 )-the reason indigenous
Peruvians voted as a bloc in these two elections is because both Toledo and Humala made electoral appeals to indigenous voters. Despite the tremendous party volatility between these two elections, indigenous identities remained activated, and thus we find evidence of indigenous political divisions in both elections. Were it not for these two parties' appeals to indigenous voters, this voting bloc would not have surfaced, and therefore Peru would continue to appear to be the outlier case in relation to its neighbors in terms of indigenous politics. 
Conclusion
Contrary to previous arguments (Yashar, 1998) , yet in keeping with the findings from other Latin American countries (Madrid, 2005b; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007 (García and Lucero, 2004) , and to economic liberalization, which weakened the ties between parties and class identities (Rice and Van Cott, 2006 These findings suggest that the missing element to the formation of an indigenous cleavage in Peruvian politics has been the absence of political identities, which were not created until 2001 with the campaign of Alejandro Toledo. As the results of this study confirm the findings of previous research demonstrating the importance of political actors to the formation of political identities cross-nationally (Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990) , the actions of parties in creating these political identities appear paramount to explaining the presence or (apparent) absence of indigenous political representation, not just in Peru, but in every other case of ethnic political competition. Future research, therefore, should lend more weight to explanations of the emergence of indigenous politics that are based on the emergence of political identities. 
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Supplementary Material
The tables in this supplementary file correspond with Figures 1 through 3 in the main text. Tables 3 and 4 correspond with the predicted probabilities displayed in Figures 1 and 2 . The alternative five-category measurement of the dependent variable in Tables 5 and 6 correspond with the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 3 . (Schmidt, 2007: 816) . 4 An OLS regression predicting the World Values Survey's 10-point income scale (ranging from lowest to highest incomes) with dummy variables for each of the three indigenous identities yielded two-sided t-values of -9.08, -5.48, and -1.72 for Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian respondents, respectively. This demonstrates significant economic marginalization among indigenous Peruvians. 5 The World Values Survey question asks respondents, -If there were a national election held tomorrow, for which party would you vote?‖ Those respondents initially answering -don't know‖ were asked a follow-up question: -Which party appeals to you most?‖ 6 We opted to include all respondents because a substantial number of respondents in each survey stated that they would not vote or would cast a blank ballot. While we think that there is something to be said for examining the social bases of the parties relative to the whole sample, others may not agree and insist upon examining the parties' supporters relative to actual voters only. Because this concern is merited, we reran the analyses with the restricted data set to check for robustness and found that these robustness checks did not substantially alter the results.
